SHORT
REPORT ON CAPTURE OF GENERAL KREIPE
(Quote
from http://www.illmetbymoonlight.info/paddy-s-letter-to-the-cretans.html
)
Report
8 KREIPE report
Below is the text of Major Patrick Leigh Fermor's
short report on the capture of General Kreipe. It is taken verbatim from
National Archive File HS 5/728 . None of the errors have been corrected. These
will be pointed out later.
SECRET
SHORT
REPORT ON CAPTURE OF GENERAL KREIPE
Map:
CRETE 1:250,000.
16 May 1944
On February 4 I dropped in to CRETE on the KATHARO plateau,
the LASITHI PROVINCE and made a good landing. Captain MOSS, Stanley, Coldstream
Guards, and the two CRETANS that formed the rest of the party were unable to
follow, owing to the sky suddenly clouding. They came back on seven nights
during the next two months but the weather was consistently bad, and after
several sea attempts, they finally landed at SOUTSOURO on 4th April.
Our orders were to capture the GERMAN General Commanding
the 22nd SEBASTOPOL (BREMEN) Div., then General MULLER. Shortly before MOSS's
arrival with the remainder of the party, MULLER was withdrawn from that command
and replaced by General KREIPE, who had served in FRANCE and on the LENINGRAD
and KUBAN fronts.
We and our party, now seven strong, struck North across
MONOFATSI, and PEDIADA counties, and established and a HQ in the mountains
above KOSTAMONITZA. I then left for HERAKLION in shepherd costume to recce the
area MICHAEL AKOUMIANAKIS our HERAKLION agent and I had chosen as the mostly
likely one. This lay at Pt .1727 at the junction of the ARCHANES road and the
HOUDESTI-HERAKLION road, where a sharp twist in the road would force any
vehicle to slow up considerably. This was the most suitable place on the road
from ARCHANES (KREIPE's Div HQ) and KNOSSOS, where he lived at the VILLA
ARIADNE . Several days recce prove that he left his house at any time between
dusk and 9 o'clock. The plan was formed to carry out the operation on this return
journey, under the cover of darkness.
Three difficulties were:-
1) To be sure of not mistaking another car for the
General's.
2) Disposing of any other vehicle and its occupants should
they passed during the Op.,
3) Avoiding bringing down reprisals on the local
population.
The first was obviated by placing an agent (ELIAS
ATHANASSAKIS) to acquaint himself thoroughly with the shape of the car, size of
blackout-slits on headlamps etc. He did this excellently. The second difficulty
was to be dealt with by using a small ANDARTES Band, to capture the passengers
and ditch any traffic that made an untoward appearance .The third problem was
more difficult, and I left HERAKLION (where I spent two nights) for HQ at's
KOSTAMONITZA, where Capt. MOSS, M. AKOUMIANAKIS and I had a conference and
worked out a plan. As the operation panned out exactly as we laid our scheme in
every detail except one (the abolition of the Partisan Band at the last
moment), I will not go over it twice.
When the plan was arrived at, I summoned ATHANASIOS
BOURDZALIS, a good Patriot from ASIA MINOR, with a band of 15 CRETAN ANDARTES ,
to our HQ, added them to our party of 9 and move Westwards with them by night
on the 19th/20th of April, spending the next day at KHARASSO (MR: 2829), reaching
our final hideout near SKALANI, among the trees and reed of dried-up river bed
at MR: 1829, 20 minutes' march from the proposed site of the Op. The party
turned out to be too large for effective concealment in this rather dangerous
traitorous area near HERAKLION, and we unwillingly sent the Partisans back,
none of whom were in the picture, on most friendly terms, and decided to carry
out the Op. with a party of 9 picked men, on a nucleus of our own immediate
followers 2 or 3 years in the service. We then lay up and waited for the right
moment. This was one of the most trying parts of the Op. Four evenings running
he came back before dusk, as if he had got wind of the plan. On the fifth,
however, night fell and he was still at his Div HQ, so Capt. MOSS and I put on
GERMAN police-corporal uniforms, and hastened with out (sic) party to the
road-fork. EL IAS was posted near ARKHANES to signal one torch flash at the
approach of the car, (2 flashes if accompanied) to a scout posted nearer us who
was to signal down half a kilometre of flex to an electric bell, next to
another scout who was to flash the signal to us. MOSS and I took our positions
as traffic M.Ps in the road, the men (who knew each detail of the drill by
heart) hidden ditches either side of the road-fork.
At 9: 30 the warning signal flash came, and three minutes
later the car came slowly round the bend. MOSS and I waved red lamps up and
down, and the car stopped, we walked towards the two doors drawing our pistols.
I opened the right door of the car, flashed the torch inside, and saw the
General was sitting beside the Chauffeur. He was easily recognizable by his
tabs, medals and Iron Crosses. I asked him his papers in GERMAN, and while he
was explaining, MOSS open the other door, struck the driver hard with a life
preserver, took him by the shoulders, threw him out to the waiting CRETANS, who
quickly disarmed, handcuffed and bound him, and started off for the hills. MOSS
then jumped into the driver's seat.
My party and I simultaneously seized the General handcuffed
and bound him, and put him in the back of the car. PATERAKIS, TYRAKIS, and
SAVIOLAKIS jumped in beside him, with three sub-machine guns stuck out of the
windows, and had the general covered by two fighting- knives.
The rest of the party dispersed at once; I put on the
General's hat and sat in his seat beside MOSS, who started up the engine and
headed for HERAKLION. The whole halt and operation took over just over a
minute, and the CRETANS carried out their parts like clockwork. A car and three
troop-trucks passed two minutes after the starting up, so we had done it in the
nick of time.
We drove on past SPILLIA KNOSSOS, and TEKE, and into
HERAKLION market-square, through the CANEA Gate, main German post in
HERAKLION and out along the RETIMO road. We passed 22 road-in all. The sentry
at one attempted to stop us by waving his torch up and down, but MOSS drove
straight on at the same speed. Other sentries saluted or stood to attention
when they saw the two pennants of the car. We chose this route as being the
most improbable one and the least likely to arouse suspicion: in this we were
not wrong.
We drove for about an hour and a half to YENI GAVE (MR:
870370) where MOSS, PATERAKIS, and SAVIOLAKIS got out with the General, who was
then unbound (having volunteered his word of honour not to escape nor to draw
attention to himself in the event of GERMANS being near). After the first shock
he seemed to accept the' fait accompli' fatalistically, and I informed him that
he was an honourable prisoner of war captured by BRITISH officers and would be
treated as such. That party, under MOSS, then set off up the foothills of Mount
IDA in the direction of ANOYEIA, a large and patriotic maintain village. I then
drove the car on with TYRAKIS to a point between CHELIANA (MR: 835575) and
MOURDZANA, were a footpath runs northward to a suitable submarine beach at
AMYRA (ISLD did actually make a landing here last year).
We left a sealed letter addressed to General BRAUER and all
GERMAN authorities in CRETE (appended), stating that the general had been taken
prisoner by BRITISH officers shortly before, and by the time the letter was
read, would be on his way to CAIRO.
We then abandoned the car without destroying it, and left a
BRITISH overcoat inside of corroborative detail. By this process we hope to
exculpate CRETANS, living near the scene of abduction, of suspicion. The ruse
was successful. We then struck Southwards towards ANOYIA and reached it as dawn
broke my GERMAN uniform caused looks of hate in this notoriously lawless
village. During the afternoon planes patrolled the North coast constantly and
Fieseler-Storch hovered for three hours over every peak and ravine in
Mount IDA, dropping hastily turned-outs leaflets stating General KREIPE had
been captured by bandits, that his whereabouts could not be unknown to the
population and that, unless he was surrendered within three days, all the
local villages of HERAKLION province would be razed to the ground and the
sternest measures brought to bear on the civilian population.
To the lasting credit of the CRETANS that, though hundreds
(till he was finally evacuated) knew his whereabouts, the secret was loyally
kept. Indeed our progress was a kind of royal procession of enthusiasm and
congratulation.
MOSS's party and mine contacted at nightfall we set off
with an escort of ANOYEIANS and the General en route to the steep northern
slopes of IDA, till we reach the lair of MICHAEL XYLOURIS band of Partisans.
The party detailed to conduct the GERMAN driver across
MONOFATSI Province to the same RV arrived soon after, but, without the driver
who had been so badly hit and walked so slowly that he had to be disposed of on
the way owing to the hue and cry in the plains.
Next day we marched right over the top of Mount IDA through
deep snow (one of the most difficult and arduous climbs in CRETE which the
General performed on foot), exchanging a bodyguard of XYLORIS' men for a
party belonging to PETRAKOGIORGES band half-way. Advance scouts sent down the
Southern slope of the mountain lit a series of beacon fires to show that the
way was clear as ugly rumours of GERMAN concentrations in the AMARI below us
were beginning to come in. A thousand GERMANS spread over the foothill
villages was the most-named figure. We fetched up in the labyrinthine cave and
remained there all next day. Morale continued to be extremely high.
About here are troubles began. Our carefully planned RV
with Major DUNBABIN fell through as he was down with malaria somewhere in the
AMARI and the charging-engine of his set with XZYLOURI's Band was out of order.
Runners were sent hot-foot to three other sets, two in Western RETIMO Province,
the other (RENDELL's (sic) ) far to the east near HIERAPETRA in LASITHI. But
communications were very long and it was many days before we got an answer from
any of them, and then the plans outlined were out of date and the
quickly-changing situation made them impossible anyway.
We managed by an intricate system of posts along the
foothills to slip our heavily armed caravan through the cordons and reached
AYIA PARASKEVI, hoping to escape from SAKHTOURIA beach, a nights march SW of
here. The day after we arrived, however, SAKHTOURIA village was burnt to the
ground and most of the male population arrested owing to a gun-running operation
there three weeks before, in which no less than 50 mules, laden with rifles,
had fanned out all over Central CRETE. We could also hear the explosions and
see the smoke of the villages of LOCHRIA, KAMARES and MAGARIKARI being bombed
and blown up owing to the indiscrete conduct of PG's gang over the Easter
celebrations some weeks before.
Intensive enemy activity, patrols etc, began all along the
south coast, prohibiting its useful evacuation purposes. It was the opinion of
several BLO's that the Germans were expecting an invasion. After three days
fruitless waiting at AGIA PARESKEVI, I decided to push NW with my henchmen to
contact ISLD or BARNES directly and use their sets for arranging the
evacuation. MOSS remained behind with the General and the party and did
splendid work keeping them cheerful and optimistic through these trying days. I
had heard that one of the sets was at PANTANASIA, but found it had pushed
further West. I spent the next two days sending runners out in all directions
to I finally contacted Capt BARNES of Force 133. The latter contacted me at the
YENI on the 7th of May.
On the morning the 8th a runner brought a message, stating
that Force 133 was sending in a SBS party of JELLICOE's with a W/T and
instructions to contact us at all costs near LIMNI beach. This was most
encouraging and showed the Office was doing the utmost to back us up a hundred
percent, and would have been a solution to all our difficulties. Unfortunately
hot on this runner's tail came another, whom I had sent to recce that
particular beach, with the intelligence that Huns pullaulated there and a
post had been established as it SAKHTOURIA. So there was nothing for it but to
move Westward to find a place where we could slip through the net.
MOSS and the main party meanwhile had advanced to PATSOS
(MR: 625265) via YERAKARI ( MR: 645240) where I contacted him, and on the night
of the 9th/10th we marched to PHOTINOU, exchanging escort on the way. On the
night of the10th/11th we marched on through VILLANDREDO where I contacted Capt.
CICLITERA who had moved to ASI GONIA to meet us. We at once sent recce
parties to a beach West of RODAKINO and suggested to Force 133 the night of the
14th/15th as a suitable evacuation date. Our scouts returned to state that the
beach was miraculously of GERMANS.
A W/T came confirming our date, times, place and signals
and on the night of the 13th/14th we struck South over the barren RODAKINO
mountains and reached the point at nightfall on the 14th.
Moss gave the signals and the craft arrived on the stroke
of 23:00 hrs. local time as had been agreed. The first to land was Lieut.
BAILEY and his Raiding Force, bitterly disappointed at missing the adventure of
contacting us in the interior of CRETE. I repeat the dispatch of this raiding
party was an excellent idea and might well have proved our salvation if things
had been stickier.
The embarkation took place with model efficiency dispatch
and we set sail for MERSA MATRUH with our prisoner. It was a great relief
for all of us to have brought the operation to a successful conclusion after
these 18 anxious days in the CRETAN mountains
The General's behaviour was most friendly and helpful
throughout and he put up with the hardships of mountain travel living rough
with fortitude. MOSS and I had the impression that he had lost his nerve a bit
after the first contact with us. He certainly made no attempt to escape.
One or two untoward events occurred. Firstly, the loss of
his Knights Cross of the Iron Cross on the first nights march, which we made
every attempt to discover, and secondly, two very bad falls, one from a mule
and another from a ten foot precipice in the dark, in which he injured his
shoulder. We surrounded him throughout with whatever amenities, i.e. mules,
warm clothing, food, drink, bedding etc that were possible in the
circumstances, and he was treated both by ourselves and all our staff will all
fitting deference and respect. I think he understood this was grateful for it.
I should like to state that any credit to the BRITISH
personnel for the success of this operation was due in exactly equal shares to
captain MOSS and myself as we collaborated intimately on every single detail.
The conduct of the backing's CRETANS were superb. Three main helpers in the
abduction were: –
MANOLIS
PATERAKIS of KOUSTOYERAKO
GEORGE
TYRAKES of PHOURPHOURAS
MICHAEL
AKOUMIANAKIS of KNOSSOS
The rest of the abduction party, all old hands and worthy
of praise, were:-
GREGORY
CHNARAS of THRAPSANO
Gendarme ANTONY ZOIDAKIS, of AY. YIANNI
(AMARI)
ANTONY PAPALIONIDAS of ASIA MINOR
Gendarme STRATIS SAVIOLAKIS, of ANAPOLIS
NIKOS
KOMIS, of THRAPSANO
DIMITRI
TZATZAS, of EPISKOPI (HERAKLION)
ELIAS
ATHANASSAKIS. of HERAKLION
PAVLOS
ZOGRAPHISTOS, of SKALANI
All Representing Different Areas of Crete
COPY OF THE LETTER LEFT IN KREIPE's CAR
TO THE GERMAN AUTHORITIES IN CRETE
23rd
of April 1944.
Gentlemen,
Your Divisional-Commander KREIPE was captured a short time
ago by a BRITISH raiding force under our command. By the time you read this he
and we will be on our way to CAIRO.
We would like to point out most emphatically that this operation
has been carried out without the help of CRETANS or CRETAN Partisans, and the
only guide used were serving soldiers of his Hellenic Majesties Forces in the
Middle East, who came with us.
Your General honourable prisoner of war, and will be treated
with all the consideration owing to his rank.
Any reprisals against the local population will be wholly
unwarranted and unjust.
Auf baldiges Wiederschen!
………………..Major
Commanding Raiding Forces
……………….Capt.
Coldstream Guards
P.S. We are very sorry to leave this motor-car
behind